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Research on wage dispersion and firm performance focuses on intra-firm and inter firm effects 
irrespective of workers’ profession. We extend the analysis by considering dispersion within 
professions, within and across firms and within professions economy-wide. We find that the 
intra-firm dispersion of wages, which research so far has focused on, has limited effects on 
productivity compared to the economy-wide wage dispersion within the professions. As Swedish 
firms have differentiated wages among employees during the last 10-15 years also the economy-
wide dispersion within professions has increased thus contributing considerably to the strong 
performance of the Swedish economy in the late1990.s. 
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Introduction 
Research on the relation between wage dispersion and productivity focuses on the distribution of 
wages within and between firms (or plants or industries) irrespective of the individuals’ 
profession.
1 However, since firms employ a large number of workers of different professions, 
focusing on the wage distribution within or between firms only tests for effects of individuals’ 
wage comparisons across non-peers, i.e. comparisons across different professions. Fairness 
arguments as well as so called “tournament” arguments for why dispersion matters to firms’ 
performance should be expected to be more prominent among peers than among non-peers. A 
better understanding of “which” wage dispersion matters for the incentives to perform well would 
therefore be gained if peer and non-peer effects of wage dispersion are separated on a detailed 
level. Using employer-employee data on 114 individual professions we analyse the productivity 
effects of wage differentials within and between professions, within as well as across firms. Thus, 
the contribution is to add the profession dimension to the literature on intra-firm wage dispersion 
and firm performance.  
 
Firms hire from other firms and workers may raise their salaries or wages by changing 
employers. Hence, outside options affect workers performance implying that the economy-wide 
dispersion within each profession may influence productivity. Therefore, we not only test if wage 
dispersion among peers within the firm affects productivity, but also if wage dispersion among 
peers in the whole labour market stimulates work effort. If wage dispersion increases among all 
employees of a given profession in an economy this may stimulate the individuals’ effort since 
workers may signal their high productivity not only to the present employer but also to better 
paying external employers.  
 
The Swedish labour market is an excellent case to study since major changes have taken place in 
the last decades. For many years, Sweden was characterised by centralised wage setting 
combined with a wage structure that in an international comparison was extremely compressed. 
This was the result of a wage policy of union solidarity that was a leading principle particularly 
                                                 
1 For studies based on employer-employee data, see Heyman (2005), Lallemand et al (2004), Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller (1999) and Eriksson (1999). Some of these separate white-collar from blue-collar workers and Heyman 
(200) and Eriksson (1999) also analyse managers. Levine (1993) analyse questionnaire results about how   2
among blue-collar workers’ trade unions. Compression reached a peak in the first part of the 
1980.s but since then, and particular during the last 10 to 15 years, Sweden has experienced 
major changes in wage setting practices and in wage structures. The employers’ confederation, 
once the proponent of centralised wage setting,
2 initiated a decentralisation process in the early 
1980.s. As employers’ confederation rejected fully centralized wage bargaining, blue-collar 
workers’ wage bargaining has since then taken place mainly at the industry level. Much more far-
reaching changes characterize white collar workers as their unions gradually during the 1980.s 
and 1990.s accepted wage setting at the individual level. We show that this process of 
decentralisation has been followed by drastic increases in wage differences among white-collar 
workers, a development in sharp contrast to the one for blue-collar workers for which unions 
have maintained very narrow wage differences.  
 
The fact that the initiative for wage decentralisation was taken by the employers’ confederation 
suggests that individual wage setting would raise workers’ productivity. Individual wage setting 
makes it possible for firms to differentiate wages, not least among workers of similar profession 
and education, so as to stimulate productivity. This notion finds theoretical support in 
“tournament” models
3 where wage inequality within a firm stimulates work effort as the most 
productive worker wins the “tournament prize”. The tournament model has been interpreted 
relatively freely in the empirical literature as it has been applied to groups outside managerial 
positions. The general interpretation is that wage dispersion stimulates individuals’ effort much 
irrespective of where in the firms’ hierarchy the individual is placed. For an economy where 
workers move easily across firms, the notion that more wage dispersion stimulates productivity 
may be extended also to the economy-wide dispersion within the profession. 
 
However, there are also alternative theories that stress fairness and cooperation among workers 
arguing that wage compression among workers fosters work effort.
4 Of course, both of these 
theories could be correct. More wage dispersion could benefit productivity if wages initially are 
                                                                                                                                                              
compensation executives set wages for carpenters, electricians, and programmers. See also Levine (1991), Akerlof 
and Yellen (1988). 
2 See Alexopoulos and Cohen (2004) who also give a detailed description of changes in the Swedish wage setting 
system. 
3 Lazear and Rosen (1981). 
4 Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Levine (1991).   3
very compressed, while more wage dispersion could be harmful to productivity if wages initially 
are much differentiated. Indeed, results in Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) seem to 
corroborate the notion of such a hump-shaped relation.
5 Considering that wages initially were 
highly compressed in Sweden, we should expect to find that increasing wage dispersion among 
Swedish white-collar workers would raise productivity, i.e. that wage dispersion was below the 
productivity maximising point. Thus, we should expect “tournament” arguments to be more 
important than “fairness” arguments in this case.
6 
 
Other studies have mainly focussed on the effects of wage dispersion on firm profits. We focus 
on the productivity effects of wage setting, i.e. the dependent variable is labour productivity in 
the firm. Though profits may be the final variable that the firm aims at maximizing by its wage 
setting, labour productivity is the relevant variable that the firm may affect. Certainly, a higher 
productivity is expected to stimulate profits.
7 
 
Using a large employer-employee data set, we find that firms’ labour productivity is strongly 
affected if firms have a large number of workers in categories where economy-wide wage 
differences are large. The change in wage policy among white-collar workers in Sweden appears 
to have contributed significantly to raise firms’ productivity suggesting that workers’ effort is 
stimulated by the prospects of higher pay. However, only a minor effect comes via increased 
wage dispersion among workers in the same profession within the firm and across professions in 
the firm i.e. the effects that previous research has focused on. We find instead that the major 
effect on productivity comes via more wage dispersion across the whole labour market within 
each profession. This increased economy-wide wage dispersion within professions can be seen as 




 Trends in Swedish wage dispersion 
After wage compression peaked in the early 1980s, there followed a period of wage 
                                                 
5 See also Lallemand et al (2004). 
6 This seems consistent with findings in Hibbs and Locking (2000). 
7 For instance, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) use wage levels as a likely proxy for firm productivity, 
Lallemand et al (2004) use gross operating surplus per worker, Heyman (2005) profits per employee.   4
differentiation among white-collar workers but the increases in wage dispersion were modest.
8 
This process accelerated, however, in the mid 1990.s and wage differences increased 
precipitously among white-collar workers. As seen in Figure 1, where wage dispersion is 
measured by the squared coefficients of variation, this tendency is particularly strong among 
white-collar workers in private sectors towards the end of the 1990.s.
9 We also see large increases 
in wage dispersion among white-collar workers in the public health sector. Notable is also that 
the coefficient has not increased and even decreased slightly among blue-collar workers in the 
private sector.
10 Workers in local government, outside the health sector, belonging to blue-collar 
workers’ unions have also maintained a highly compressed wage structure.  
 


















Local government, excluding health services
Blue-collar workers, private sector
White-collar workers, private sector
All sectors
 
Source: Based on data from Statistics Sweden. See Appendix 1. 
 
Finally, we note that the increasing wage differentials among white-collar workers have driven 
                                                 
8 The small changes in wage differences since the mid 1980.s to the mid 1990.s are documented in OECD (1996). 
9 These are workers in categories covered by the two white-collar worker confederations TCO (The Swedish 
Confederation for Professional Employees) and SACO (The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations). 
10 These are workers in categories that are covered by blue-collar workers’ confederation, LO.   5
up the economy wide variation of wages, which, as measured by the squared coefficient of 
variation, has increased from less than .12 in 1995 to more than .18 in 2002. It is of interest to see 
how much of this increase has taken place within the professions and how much across the 
professions. In Figure 2 we show total wage dispersion and wage dispersion within the 
professions 1996-2002, the difference between these two curves is the variation of wages across 
the 114 professions. Wage dispersion has increased both within the professions as well as across 
the professions. The large increases took place in the late 1990.s while wage dispersion was fairly 
stable in the early 2000.s.  
 














































Total variation Variation within categories.
 
Source: Based on data from Statistics Sweden. See Appendix 1. 
 
 
Productivity and the prospects of better pay 
This development of wage dispersion raises interesting questions. The transition to individual 
wage setting at the firm level, strongly pushed for by employers, raises the scope for firms to   6
stimulate the individual workers’ effort. But, as noted, wage dispersion within each profession 
economy-wide, has also increased. While we have no information about the individuals’ 
productivity, our employer-employee data allows us to illuminate the effects of wage differentials 
within professions economy-wide on firms’ productivity. In this section we first test the 
hypothesis that firms having employed many workers in categories where economy-wide wage 
differences are large enjoy higher productivity than firms having employed few workers in these 
categories. A flat wage distribution in the economy yields weak incentives to work hard since 
relatively little is to be gained by the individual of being productive. A steep economy-wide wage 
distribution yields strong incentives for good performance as workers are mobile across firms.  
 










   (1) 
where k wwd is the weighted wage difference among the professions that are represented in each 
firm k. ajk is the number of workers of category j in firm k and Σajk is the total number of workers 
in firm k.
11 With coefficients of variation for our professions j CofV  (j=1…114) we can define for 
each firm a coefficient of variation weighted by the number of workers in each category. A firm 
with a large number of professions where wages differ a lot will get a high value of k wwd , while 
a firm with a large number of professions where wages do not differ much will get a low value 
of k wwd . If incentives to work hard and be more productive are higher in the first group, we 
should expect a firm with a large number of such professions to be more productive. We assume 
that the higher is k wwd  in firm k the higher will be the level of productivity in that firm. 
 
In testing this hypothesis, we start with a constant returns production function for a single firm 
with inputs of high skilled labour in efficiency units,  h eL , low skilled labour in efficiency units, 
l eL , and capital, K. To these inputs we add a firm specific factor f to get
12 
                                                 
11Assume, for instance, a firm having 100 employees of which 75 are metal workers and 25 are civil engineers. The 
wwd would then be .75 times metal workers’ coefficient of variation plus .25 times civil engineers’ coefficient of 
variation. 
12 Cf. Levine (1992).   7
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where ε* is an error term uncorrelated with the inputs. To simplify, we have deleted the firm 
index. To obtain labour productivity, P, we divide both sides by the total number of workers, 
) ( l L L L h + = : 
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Effort, e, is assumed to be a function of the relative wage, wwdk , which is specified as e= wwdk
α . 
In the empirical specification we differentiate labour into high skilled and low skilled to get the 
estimable function: 
 
0 lnP ln ln ln ln ln kt kt ks hkt lkt kt kt t wwd Z L L K L α γβ δ τ κ η ε =+ + + + + − +         (4) 
 
where ) ( 2 1 d d + =α γ and k is an index of firms and t represents time. Zks is a dummy variable of 
firm k aimed at capturing specific properties of the sector to which firm k belongs. This captures 
the major differences between for instance firms in service sectors and firms in different 
manufacturing sectors. The capital stock, Kk, is measured as the value of machinery and 
equipment, in firm k. Both these variables are included to control for the major determinants of 
productivity differences across firms, namely the factor supplies. Productivity is measured as the 
firm’s value added, divided by the total number of workers in the firm.  
 
In Table 1 we present six different specifications. Model 1 shows the results of an OLS regression 
with all variables measured in the same year, 2002. The estimated elasticity of the weighted wage 
difference variable is .23 and is highly significant suggesting that wage differences in a 
profession raise productivity significantly in a firm using workers in that category. Also the 
estimates of the parameters of the two factor supply variables come out highly significant.  
 
We need to discuss possible caveats with the formulation of equation (4). First, is it possible that   8
our variable wwdkt captures skill-biased technological change (SBTC) which then, in turn, affects 
productivity? Note that the variable as specified in (1) weighs and add the economy-wide wage 
distribution within the individual professions that are represented in the firm.
13 SBTC should 
raise average wage of skilled workers compared to the average wage of unskilled workers but 
leave the wage distribution within the individual professions unaltered.
14 Thus, SBTC leaves the 
variable wwd unchanged. SBTC is instead captured by the inclusion of the changes in factors of 
production demanded by the firm. 
 
Could wage differences within a given profession be affected by firms’ productivity? If this is the 
case, wwdk would be affected by Pk and hence not be truly exogenous and our estimates would be 
biased. This would occur only if a productivity increase raises the dispersion of productivity that 
in turn would affect wage dispersion. However, since we estimate the level of firms’ productivity 
as a function of the profession weighted wage distribution, such an effect is very unlikely. Yet, 
should a problem in this respect exist, a remedy for such a source of estimation bias could be to 
estimate (4) using wwdk,t-1 rather than wwdk,t . It could also be the case that the productivity effect 
emerges with a lag of one year. The results when the firms’ productivity of the year 2002 is 
estimated as a function of weighted wage differences in 2001 are presented as Model 2. The 
estimated parameter comes out somewhat lower than for wwdk,t, (.14), but is again highly 
significant and supports the general conclusion that the increased wage dispersion affects 
productivity favourably. 
 
An alternative specification involves the use of instrumental variables. Wage dispersion is, 
however, a variable not easily instrumented and the only possible instrument for wwdk, is wwdk,t-1. 
The correlation between these two variables is .75. In Model 3, we present the results of this IV-
estimation. We see that the estimated parameter now is somewhat higher: .34. The estimate is 
again highly significant, supporting the hypothesis that the increased wage differences within 
many professions have affected productivity in a favourable way. Thus, the results in Model 2 
and 3, strongly support the fact that we have no reason to believe that our wage dispersion 
variable should not be truly exogenous. 
                                                 
13 Note also that there are as many as 114 professions in the data implying that workers skill levels are homogenous 
within each category. 
14 Note that we have as many as 114 professions represented in data.   9
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  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of obs.  3882 2901 2901 3348 3647 3348 
R
2  .3538 .3839 .3836 .3717 .3676 .3759 
Table 1. Estimates of the effects of wage dispersion within professions on firms’ 
productivity. Estimated on double logarithmic form. Robust estimates. 52 sector dummy 
variables have been used. The correlation between wwdk,t and wwdk,t-1  is .75.  
 
How large is this estimated effect of wage dispersion on productivity? The estimations based on 
wwdk,t yielded an elasticity of .23. Labour productivity, measured as an average in all sectors, 
increased by approximately 2.28 % per year between 1996 and 2002 which is considerably higher 
than the average for the Euro area (.84) and higher than the OECD average (1.61).
15 Average 
wage dispersion within categories increased by approximately 5.4 % per year. Our result in 
Model 1 Table 1 would then suggest that 1.24 out of the 2.28 percent, i.e. around half of the 
productivity gains should be ascribed increasing wage differences. However, some caution 
should be taken in interpreting the results for such large changes in the wage dispersion. 
 
                                                 
15 OECD Economic Outlook (2006).   10
Our main purpose is to evaluate which wage dispersion that matters most. To test how other 
dispersion variables affect productivity of the firm and to see if our weighted wage distribution 
within professions yields a robust estimate, we include in Table 1 also the results from estimating 
three other models. We may first ask if the dispersion of wages for a profession within the firm 
matters to the firm’s productivity. Is the fact that the wage dispersion within the profession 
affects productivity because it reflects the dispersion of wages for the profession within the firm? 
Instead of defining wage differences for the professions economy-wide we thus do it for the 










   (5) 
which differs from equation (1) only in that the coefficient of variation now has an index k 
indicating that it is the wage distribution of the profession in firm k that matters. The coefficient 
of variation for a profession within a firm can only be calculated for some minimum number of 
workers in that category and we restrict this number to five.  
 
Model 4 shows the results when the variable specified in (5) is added and we see that the 
estimated parameter of the profession wage dispersion remains stable and is only slightly reduced 
from a value of .23 (Model 1) to .21. The added variablewwdf comes out with the expected 
positive sign and is significant. The effect of this variable is, however, much smaller than the 
effect of increased wage dispersion within the professions economy-wide, wwd. 
 
Does the distribution of wages across all professions within the firm matter? Such non-peer 
effects are what much previous research has focused on. In Model 5 we have included a variable 
of the wage distribution in the firm, wdk , measuring the coefficient of variation across all 
employees in the firm. In line with Akerlof and Yellen one could argue that a wider distribution 
of wages in the firm would have a negative impact on productivity. However, as noted above, this 
is less likely to apply to firms in an egalitarian economy while “tournament” effects are more 
likely. One could also argue that some workers at the lower end would feel unfairly treated and 
lower effort while those at the other end would be stimulated to raise effort. The overall 
qualitative effect is therefore ambiguous.    11
 
As seen in Table 1, Model 5, this variable yields a positive but low parameter estimate. We also 
see that our variable in focus, wwdk , is robust also with respect to the inclusion of the distribution 
of all wages in the firm. The estimated parameter is now .18. 
 
Finally, in Model 6, we include both the variable as specified in (5) and a variable on firms’ 
internal wage dispersion. We see that our estimated parameter of the variable representing the 
wage distribution across professions is slightly lower (.15) while the estimated parameter of wdk  
is slightly higher. However, the variable wwdfkt, measuring the effects of the distribution of 
wages within the professions in firms, yields an estimate that is still significant but now only on 
the 10 percent level. 
 
Clearly, the variables that the firm may affect as wage setting is decentralised to the individual 
level for the white-collar workers, are the distribution within professions within the firms (wwdfkt 
) and the internal wage distribution across professions (wdk). Changes in wage dispersion in these 
two dimensions appear to affect firms’ productivity but the major effect derives from the fact that 





Wage dispersion can be analysed in different dimensions. Earlier research has analysed the 
effects on firms’ performance of the wage structure across all workers or across some broad 
groups of workers within the firm or across the firms. We have used worker-firm linked data 
covering 114 different professions of the Swedish workforce and we have analysed the effects of 
wage dispersion 1) within the professions economy-wide, 2) within the professions within the 
firms, and 3) across the professions within the firms. This allows us to investigate which 
dimension of wage dispersion that matters the most to firms’ performance. 
 
The changes in Swedish wage setting among white-collar workers make this economy an ideal 
one for such an evaluation. Decentralization implied that local firms could affect the wage of the   12
individual employee and thus increase the scope for efficiency wage setting in a way previously 
not experienced. Many of the changes towards decentralised wage setting were motivated by 
employers’ need for wage differences that should encourage the individual employee to invest in 
skills, to take own initiatives and raise effort. The individualization of wage setting among white-
collar workers was followed by increases in wage dispersion within and across white collar 
professions. 
 
We find that the dominating effect of increased wage dispersion on firms’ productivity is not 
related to the firm itself, but to the dispersion of wages among workers of the same category 
across the whole economy. Thus, when Swedish employers demanded wages to be set at the 
individual level a minor productivity enhancing effect occurred as firms differentiated wages, 
while the major effect occurred when wage dispersion increased economy-wide, a factor which 
was outside the control of any individual firm. This result suggests that workers’ performance 
responds to possible outside options. 
 
The fact that the economy-wide wage dispersion within the professions matters the most 
highlights the importance of trade unions’ wage policies and in particular their attitudes to wage 
compression. Our results derive from changes in wage dispersion among white-collar workers 
and the results indicate that their unions’ attitude towards wage dispersion is of great importance 
to firms’ performance. However, it is not obvious that the results carry over to blue-collar 
workers, as their effort could be of less importance to the firm. It could be that the dispersion of 
inherent productivity among white-collar workers is higher implying that the scope for enhancing 
effort is greater among these workers than among blue-collar workers. It also appears crucial that 
the incentives to perform well is particularly strong among managerial workers and other white-
collar workers on central positions in firms and less so among blue collar workers that to a 
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All data are taken from Statistics Sweden’s data sets. To Statistics Sweden’s annual wage 
investigations has been added wage data from “Kommunförbundet” and “Landstingsförbundet” 
(together making up The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions) and “Svenskt 
Näringsliv” (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise).  
 
Wages cover the period 1995-2002 and include a basic fixed wage (salary), any extra wage 
income like bonuses, any compensation for inconvenient work hours or compensation while “on 
duty”, the value of fringe benefits, compensations in cash etc. All wages are expressed in full 
time month equivalents.  
 
Seniority is measured as number of years with the present employer. This variable is limited back 
in time to 1995, i.e. has a maximum value of 6. The government sector is treated as one employer 
since no information is available about the number of years with the individual employers in the 
sector.  
 
Education is divided into 6 groups with elementary education normalised. The other education 
levels are two years of high school, three years of high school, university less than three years, 
university at least three years (but not doctoral degree), and Ph.D. 
 
Profession rests on ILO’s international classification of professions, ISCO-88, and is reported on 
a three digit level (SSYK-3). 
 
Capital stock is measured as total value of machinery and inventories in the firm.  
 
Share of highly educated is the number of employees with at least two years of college education 
as a share of all employees. 
 
The total number of individuals is 2 261 514 and covers employees on permanent as well as 
temporary positions and includes entrepreneurs with employment conditions according to 
agreements. The number of positions is larger, 2 305 534, since some individuals have income 
from several jobs. 
 
Some means and min and max values: 
     Variable             Mean         Min        Max 
% women       44             
Year of birth       1959          1937       1984 
Share elementary school <9 years    8.4 % 
Share high school    48.0 %      
Share university <2 years    5.4 % 
Share university>=2 years   31.5 % 
Share Ph.D.        1.4 % 
Monthly wage in SKR           22053         9646    1137890 
Average # of employments    1.06  1  7 
 